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COMMENTARY
SHELDON H. ELSEN*
As a trial lawyer with practical experience in the area of corporate miscon-
duct, I have had the opportunity to deal firsthand with the rules governing con-
duct in various corporations.  Based upon my experience representing corpora-
tions and corporate executives, I agree with Professors Deborah A. DeMott1
and James D. Cox2 that the rules actually governing conduct are often different
from those written in compliance programs and codes of conduct.  However,
while Professor DeMott refers to these unwritten rules as incentives to break
the law, my experience leads me instead to characterize them as pressures to
break the law.  I believe this difference in language carries with it a different
appraisal of the resulting misconduct, and a somewhat different sense of what
to do about it.  Specifically, I can think of two situations I have experienced
that lead me to this characterization.
The first situation involved foreign bribery investigations.  In response to
the SEC’s campaign to require public companies to disclose foreign bribery, I
was retained by a Fortune 100 company that had food operations all over the
world.  I still vividly remember arriving in a third world country and meeting
with the company’s middle management.  They were in despair because the
company was now looking critically at activities they believed senior manage-
ment knew about and condoned.  For example, in an effort to get a license from
the local authorities for a three-inch water pipe into the plant, a plant manager
with the company let a local on his staff bribe the authorities, because the
authorities were insisting they would permit only a one-inch pipe.  The plant
manager and everyone at the plant knew bribery had to be used.  Thus, when
the plant manager learned that the head of the company’s international division
and senior management had denied any knowledge of these activities, he
scoffed and rather bitterly said that he himself had no wish to engage in these
types of activities—he taught Sunday school and was trying to bring up his chil-
dren according to an American middle-class value system.  Everyone knew
what had to be done to do business in that country, yet he was being saddled
with the blame.
No criminal or civil cases grew out of this or most foreign bribery investiga-
tions, but the result was that many middle managers, like the plant manager I
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had met, lost their jobs, while senior management adopted a holy code of ethics
and avoided dismissal.  Yet those middle managers were not rogues, and if
there was to be responsibility, it should have been assumed by the entity and
vicariously by the people at the top.
The second situation I experienced that leads me to characterize unwritten
corporate rules as pressures to break the law rather than incentives involved an
investigation of a major broker-dealer that had offices throughout the United
States.  In that case, branch managers and regional administrators with a re-
sponsibility to supervise major producers who were stepping over the line
found themselves stymied when they tried to bring their concerns up the ladder
to senior management.  There was an unwritten rule in the company that the
big producers were to be looked after.  As a result, middle management was
left to deal with the consequences of overstepping by big producers.  While the
resulting case was notorious, senior management essentially escaped un-
harmed, but the middle managers had to file Wells submissions and may well
have become the subject of SEC disciplinary proceedings had not the Johnson3
case intervened to bar such cases through the statute of limitations.
Accordingly, based on these experiences, I am inclined to agree with Pro-
fessors DeMott and Cox that entity liability or vicarious liability is an appropri-
ate response to unacceptable behavior arising from the corporation’s business
activities.  In addition, I think that senior management should have responsi-
bility thrust on it vicariously, and there should be more compassion for the
middle managers who are forced either to carry out the company’s wishes or
risk losing their jobs.
However, I have greater reservations with regard to personal liability for di-
rectors.  As Chancellor Allen persuasively argues, too tough an enforcement of
the duty of care could make it hard for corporations to attract outside direc-
tors.4  In response to this possible problem, Professor DeMott attempts to find
a reasonable halfway point by which directors can be held accountable when
senior management itself has become involved in wrongdoing.  She suggests
drawing on the standards for entity liability as set forth in the Federal Sen-
tencing Guidelines for Organizations,5 which decree that a corporation lacks an
effective compliance program when senior management or certain supervising
employees are complicit in wrongdoing.6  However, for the reasons I have
given, it is sometimes hard to say when senior management has been complicit.
Here, as elsewhere, the Sentencing Guidelines are not always wise or accurate.
It does not seem unreasonable to say, as Professor DeMott does, that the direc-
tors should have the burden of demonstrating their good faith in a situation
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where senior management has been complicit in wrongdoing.7  But the question
of proving such complicity may be a thorny one.
When there has been a criminal investigation, as in the Caremark8 case as
well as actions involving Salomon Brothers9 and Prudential Securities,10 the
company comes under pressure from law enforcement to give up its senior offi-
cials in order to save the company.  In Caremark, the company did not take
such action, but in the Salomon Brothers proceeding, the top people were sur-
rendered in order to save the company.
Putting the finger on senior management may thus happen fortuitously.  If
the directors of a corporation that has been the subject of criminal investigation
are to be more exposed to personal liability than the directors of a corporation
where there has been wrongdoing but no criminal investigation, similar cases
may not be treated alike.  Plaintiffs would have an easier time pleading and
proving the misdeeds of senior management where there has been an investiga-
tion, particularly where senior management has admitted complicity as in
Salomon Brothers, but plaintiffs might have to put in a substantial case to
prove complicity of senior management when there has been no criminal inves-
tigation.
The result may be that, if the shift of the presumption were considered im-
portant, the parties might have to engage in a sideshow at trial over the com-
plicity of senior management, rather than focus on evidence about the direc-
tors.  This might not be so if senior management were co-defendants, but that is
not always the case.
Perhaps more importantly, I have some question about how much differ-
ence shifting the presumption would make in a case where the directors could
meet their burden of showing good faith simply through their testimony, thus
leaving it for the plaintiff to prove an absence of good faith from the circum-
stantial evidence, much as the plaintiff has to today.
Thus, the result of Professor DeMott’s innovation might be a scattering of
results, a possible increase in the cost of litigation, and a sense that similar cases
are not being treated alike.  While I agree with Professor DeMott that directors
should be held accountable if they wink at a situation in which senior manage-
ment has created a culture that invites wrongdoing, I believe her concept re-
quires refining.
As to Professor Cox’s article, I am generally in agreement.  However, I do
question his conclusion that the class action has fallen out of favor.  He bases
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this conclusion on the opinions of conservative Justices in Blue Chip Stamps11
and Central Bank,12 and the 1995 Private Securities Litigation Reform Act.13
However, there are still Supreme Court Justices as well as many lower court
judges who view the class action as the Supreme Court did in Borak.14  Fur-
thermore, I can say from my own involvement in the congressional debates sur-
rounding the 1995 Reform Act that despite the changes there remained a con-
sensus among the members of Congress that the class action should be
preserved.  During the debates, critics of the class action had introduced
harsher provisions that would have effectively killed class actions.  Specifically,
critics introduced provisions to require “loser pays,”15 the destruction of the
fraud on the market theory, and pleading requirements for scienter that would
have been impossible for plaintiffs to meet. 16  But these provisions were essen-
tially all removed by what I like to think of as the informed majority of the
Senate.  While the bill that passed could indeed be characterized as critical of
what Congress considered excesses in class action practice, a majority of Con-
gress as well as the President all acted on the basic premise that the class action
plays a useful role and should be preserved. 17
I am also in agreement with Professor Cox’s criticism of the law and eco-
nomics analysis of Professor Arlen and others.18  I add only that I think he has
been too kind.  Professor Arlen’s analysis starts from the premise that corpo-
rate conduct is based on a calculus of what will make the most money.19  But
when corporate officers are considering what to do, they normally cannot make
those kinds of dollars and cents calculations.  Professor Arlen’s hypothesis that
abandonment of compliance programs will ultimately save the corporation
money strikes me as rather naive.  Indeed, the consequences of wrongdoing
may not only be civil; they may be criminal as well.  Wrongdoing may or may
not be covered by insurance.  In addition, if a scandal erupted in the newspa-
pers, management could be turned out.  Thus, a compliance program is gener-
                                                          
11. See Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723 (1975) (finding that standing to
bring a private damages suit under Rule 10b-5 is limited to actual “purchasers” or “sellers” of securi-
ties as defined in the Securities Exchange Act of 1934).
12. See Central Bank of Denver v. First Interstate Bank of Denver, 511 U.S. 164 (1994) (holding
that a private plaintiff may not bring an aiding and abetting suit under § 10(b), the general antifraud
provision of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934).
13. Pub. L. No. 104-67, 109 Stat. 737.
14. See J.I. Case Co. v. Borak, 377 U.S. 426 (1964) (holding that the Securities Exchange Act of
1934 authorizes a federal cause of action for rescission or damages to a corporation’s shareholder in
the context of a merger transaction completed pursuant to a false and misleading proxy statement).
15. The “loser pays” provision intended to make the losing side pay the attorneys’ fees for the
prevailing party.
16. In earlier versions of the bill, the plaintiff would have been required to plead the defendant’s
state of mind during each violation, without having had the benefit of discovery.
17. See generally Securities Litigation Reform Proposals: Hearings on H.R. 1058 Before the Sub-
comm. on Securities of the Senate Comm. on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs, 104th Cong. 131
(1995) (statement of Sheldon H. Elsen, Association of the Bar of the City of New York).
18. See Cox, supra note 2, at 11-20.
19. See Jennifer Arlen, The Potentially Perverse Effects of Corporate Criminal Liability, 23 J.
LEGAL STUD. 833 (1994).
ELSEN.FMT 09/16/98  4:20 PM
Page 87: Autumn 1997] ELSEN COMMENTARY 91
ally essential for protection.  While law and economics may have applications
in some areas of the law, applied here it seems out of touch with the realities of
corporate decisionmaking.
